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Abstract
Recent studies suggest that social media usage — while linked to an increased diversity of information and perspectives
for users — has exacerbated user polarization on many issues. A popular theory for this phenomenon centers on the concept
of “lter bubbles": by automatically recommending content that a user is likely to agree with, social network algorithms
create echo chambers of similarly-minded users that would not have arisen otherwise [54]. However, while echo chambers
have been observed in real-world networks, the evidence for lter bubbles is largely post-hoc.
In this work, we develop a mathematical framework to study the lter bubble theory. We modify the classic Friedkin-
Johnsen opinion dynamics model by introducing another actor, the network administrator, who lters content for users by
making small changes to the edge weights of a social network (for example, adjusting a news feed algorithm to change the
level of interaction between users).
On real-world networks from Reddit and Twitter, we show that when the network administrator is incentivized to reduce
disagreement among users, even relatively small edge changes can result in the formation of echo chambers in the network
and increase user polarization. We theoretically support this observed sensitivity of social networks to outside intervention
by analyzing synthetic graphs generated from the stochastic block model. Finally, we show that a slight modication to the
incentives of the network administrator can mitigate the lter bubble eect while minimally aecting the administrator’s
target objective, user disagreement.
1 Introduction
The past decade has seen an explosion in social media use and importance. Online social networks, which enable users
to instantly broadcast information about their daily lives and opinions to a large audience, are used by billions of peo-
ple worldwide. Social media is also used to access news [56], review products and restaurants, nd health and wellness
recommendations [59], and more.
Social networks, along with the world wide web in general, have made our world more connected. It has been widely
established that social networks and online media increase the diversity of information and opinions that individuals are
exposed to [15, 44, 46]. In many ways, the widespread adoption of online social networks has resulted in signicant positive
progress towards fullling Facebook’s mission of “bringing the world closer together”.
1.1 The puzzle of polarization
Surprisingly, while they enable access to a diverse array of information, social networks have also been widely associated
with increased polarization in society across many issues [30], including politics [3, 6, 20], science [50], and healthcare [40].
Somehow, despite the exposure to a wide variety of opinions and perspectives, individuals form polarized clusters, unable
to reach consensus with one another. In politics, increased polarization has been blamed for legislative deadlock, erratic
policies, and decreased trust and engagement in the democratic process [12, 45].
There have been many eorts to understand this seemingly counterintuitive phenomenon of increased societal polar-
ization. Classical psychological theory asserts that polarization arises from “biased assimilation” [47], i.e. individuals are
more likely to trust and share information that already aligns with their views. Isolated examples of intense polarization,
such as the 2016 US presidential election and Brexit, can be partially explained by historical, cultural, and ideological factors
[36]. However, when such examples are considered in bulk, it becomes clear that changes in social dynamics arising from
the increased use of social media must constitute a major contributing factor to the phenomenon of polarization [6, 42].
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(a) Example synthetic social network
graph.
(b) Graph after network administrator
changes just 20% of edge weight.
(c) Graph after network administrator
changes just 30% of edge weight.
Figure 1: Social network graphs after converging to equilibrium in the Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics model. Node
colors represent the opinions of individuals on an issue: dark red nodes have opinion close to 1, while dark blue nodes have
opinion close to –1. The weight of an edge (i.e, strength of connection between two individuals) is expressed by its shade.
In the middle and right networks, we introduce a network administrator who is allowed to make small changes to the
network, and is incentivized to connect users with content that is similar to their opinion. After reweighting edges by just
a small amount (i.e. ltering social content), the network administrator’s actions increase a standard measure of opinion
polarization in these graphs by 180% and 260%, respectively. This illustrates the formation of a “lter bubble" in the network.
1.2 Filter bubbles
An inuential idea put forward by Eli Pariser suggests an important mechanism for explaining why social media increases
societal polarization [54]. According to Pariser, preferential attention to viewpoints similar to those already held by an
individual is explicitly encouraged by social media companies: to increase metrics like engagement and ad revenue, recom-
mendation systems tend to connect users with information already similar to their current beliefs.
Such recommendations can be direct: friend or follow suggestions on platforms like Facebook or Twitter. Or they can
be more subtle: chronological “news feeds” on social media have universally been replaced with individually ltered and
sorted feeds which connect users with posts that they are most likely to engage with [29]. By recommending such content,
social network companies create “echo chambers" of similar-minded users. Owing to their root cause – the external ltering
of content shown to a user – Pariser called these echo chambers lter bubbles.
The danger of lter bubbles was recently highlighted by Apple CEO Tim Cook in a commencement speech at Tulane
University [27]. Filter bubbles have been blamed for the spread of fake news during the Brexit referendum and the 2016
U.S. presidential election [42], protests against immigration in Europe [34], and even measles outbreaks in 2014 and 2015
[40]. In each of these incidents, instead of bringing diverse groups of users together, social media has reinforced dierences
between groups and wedged them apart.
At least... that’s the theory. While Pariser’s ideas make logical sense, the magnitude of the “lter bubble eect” has been
disputed or questioned for lack of evidence [7, 14, 41, 53, 61, 64].
1.3 Our contributions
The goal of this paper is to better understand lter bubbles, and ultimately, to place Pariser’s theory on rmer ground. We
do so by developing a mathematical framework for studying the eect of lter bubbles on polarization in social networks,
relying on well-established analytical models for opinion dynamics [22].
Such models provide simple rules that capture how opinions form and propagate in a social network. The network itself
is typically modeled as a weighted graph: nodes are individuals and social connections are represented by edges, with higher
weight for relationships with increased interaction. We work specically with the well-studied Friedkin-Johnsen opinion
dynamics model, which models an individual’s opinion on an issue as a continuous value between –1 and 1, and assumes
that, as time progresses, individuals update their opinions based on the average opinion of their social connections [31]. The
Friedkin-Johnsen model has been used successfully to study polarization in social networks [11, 18, 19, 52].
Our contribution is to modify the model by adding an external force: a network administrator who lters social inter-
action between users. Based on modern recommendation systems [4], the network administrator makes small changes to
edge weights in the network, which correspond to slightly increasing or decreasing interaction between specic individuals
(e.g. by tuning a news feed algorithm). The administrator’s goal is to connect users with content they likely agree with,
and therefore increase user engagement. Formally, we model this goal by assuming that the network administrator seeks to
minimize a standard measure of disagreement in the social network. As individuals update their opinions according to the
Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics, the administrator repeatedly adjusts the underlying network graph to achieve its own goal.
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Using our model, we establish a number of experimental and theoretical results which suggest that content ltering by
a network administrator can signicantly increase polarization, even when changes to the network are highly constrained
(and perhaps unnoticeable by users). First, we apply our augmented opinion dynamics model to real-world social networks
obtained from Twitter and Reddit. When the network administrator changes only 40% of the total edge weight in the net-
work, polarization increases by more than a factor of 40×. These results are striking—they suggest that social networks are
very sensitive to inuence by ltering. As illustrated in Figure 1, even minor content ltering by the network administrator
can create signicant “lter bubbles”, just as Pariser predicted [54].
Next, to better understand the sensitivity of social networks to ltering, we study a standard generative model for social
networks: the stochastic block model [1]. We show that, with high probability, any network generated from the stochastic
block model is in a state of fragile consensus: that is, under the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics, the network will exhibit low
polarization, but can become highly polarized after only a minor adjustment of edge weights. Our ndings give theoretical
justication for why a network administrator can greatly increase polarization in real-world networks.
Finally, ending on an optimistic note, we show experimentally that a simple modication to the incentives of the network
administrator can greatly mitigate the lter bubble eect. Surprisingly, our proposed solution also minimally aects the
incentives of the network administrator—its objective, user disagreement, is only increased by at most 5%.
1.4 Prior work
Minimizing polarization in social networks. There has been a substantial amount of recent work which uses opinion
dynamics models to study polarization in social networks. [49] rst denes polarization in the Friedkin-Johnsen model, and
gives an algorithm for reducing polarization in social networks. [52] and [18] give methods for nding network structures
which minimize dierent functions involving polarization and disagreement in the Friedkin-Johnsen model. Our work
diers from this prior work in that we study network modications which increase polarization, rather than decreasing it.
Moreover, we study how such modications arise even when the network administrator is not explicitly incentivized to
change polarization.
Other opinion dynamics models and metrics have also been used to study network polarization. [5] gives an algorithm
for mitigating lter bubbles in an inuence maximization setting. [33] studies “controversy" in the Friedkin-Johnsen model,
a metric related to polarization, and [32] gives an algorithm for reducing controversy in networks.
Modeling lter bubbles and recommendation systems. Biased assimilation, which is when users gravitate towards
viewpoints similar to their own, has been argued as one cause of increased polarization in social networks. By general-
izing the classic DeGroot model [25] of opinion formation, [21] provides theoretical support for the biased assimilation
phenomenon and analyzes the interaction of three recommendation systems on biased assimilation. [26] models biased as-
similation in social networks using a variant of the Bounded Condence Model (BCM) [37], an opinion dynamics model that
does not assume a latent graph structure between users. Most similar to our work, [34] creates a variant of the BCM that
models biased assimilation, homophily, and algorithmic ltering, and shows how echo chambers can arise as a result of these
factors. [17] studies the more general problem of how recommendation systems increase homogeneity of user behavior.
1.5 Notation and Preliminaries
We use bold letters to denote vectors, e.g. a. The ith entry of a is denoted ai . For a matrix A, Aij is the entry in the ith row
and jth column. For a vector a ∈ Rn, let diag(a) return an n× n diagonal matrix with the ith diagonal entry equal to ai . For
a matrix A ∈ Rn×d , let rowsum(A) return a vector whose ith entry is equal to the sum of all entries in A’s ith row. We use
In×n to denote a dimension n identity matrix, and 1n to denote the all ones column vector, with the subscript omitted when
dimension is clear from context.
Every real symmetric matrix A ∈ Rn×n has an orthogonal eigendecomposition A = UΛUT where U ∈ Rn×n is or-
thonormal (i.e UTU = UUT = I ) and Λ is diagonal, with real valued entries λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ . . . ≤ λn equal to A’s eigenvalues.
We say a symmetric matrix is positive semidenite (PSD) is all of its eigenvalues are non-negative (i.e. λ1 ≥ 0). We use 
to denote the standard Loewner ordering: M  N indicates that N – M is PSD. For a square matrix M , ‖M‖2 denotes the
spectral norm of M and ‖M‖F denotes the Frobenius norm. For a vector v, ||v||2 denotes the L2 norm.
1.6 Road Map
Section 2 Introduce preliminaries on Freidkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics, which form a basis for modeling lter bubbles.
Section 3 Introduce our central “network administrator dynamics” and establish experimentally that content ltering can
signicantly increase polarization in social networks.
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Section 4 Explore these ndings theoretically by showing that stochastic block model graphs exhibit a “fragile consensus”
which is easily disrupted by outside inuence.
Section 5 Discuss a small modication to the content ltering process that can mitigate the eect of lter bubbles while
still being benecial for the network administrator.
Section 6 Briey discuss future directions of study.
2 Modeling Opinion Formation
One productive approach towards understanding the dynamics of consensus and polarization in social networks has been
to develop simple mathematical models to explain how information and ideas spread in these networks.
While there are a variety of models in the literature, we use the Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics model, which has
been used to study polarization in recent work [18, 49, 52].
2.1 Friedkin-Johnsen Dynamics
Concretely, the Friedkin-Johnsen (FJ) dynamics applies to any social network that can be modeled as an undirected, weighted
graph G. Let {v1, . . . , vn} denote G’s nodes and for all i 6= j, let wij ≥ 0 denote the weight of undirected edge (i, j) between
nodes vi and vj . Let di =
∑
j 6=i wij be the degree of node vi .
The FJ dynamics model the propagation of an opinion on an issue during a discrete set of time steps t ∈ 0, 1, . . . , T . The
issue may be specic (Do you believe that humans contribute to climate change?) or it may encode a broad ideology (Do
your political views align most with conservative or liberal politicians in the US?).
In either case, the FJ dynamics assume that the issue has exactly two poles, with an individual’s opinion encoded by
a continuous real value in [–1, 1]. –1 and 1 represent the most extreme opinions in either direction, while 0 represents a
neutral opinion. Each node vi holds an “innate” (or internal) opinion si ∈ [–1, 1] on the issue. The internal opinion vector
s = [s1, . . . , sn] does not change over time. It can be viewed as the opinion an individual would hold in a social vacuum,
with no outside inuence from others. The value of si might depend on the background, geographic location, religion, race,
or other circumstances about individual i.
In addition to an innate opinion, for every time t, each node is associated with an “expressed” or “current” opinion
z(t)i ∈ [–1, 1], which changes over time. Specically, the FJ dynamics evolves according to the update rule:
z(t)i =
si +
∑
j 6=i wijz
(t–1)
j
di + 1
. (1)
That is, at each time step, each node adopts a new expressed opinion which is the average of its own innate opinion and the
opinion of its neighbors. For a given graph G and innate opinion vector s, it is well known that the FJ dynamics converges
to an equilibrium set of opinions [11], which we denote
z∗ = lim
t→∞ z
(t).
It will be helpful to express the FJ dynamics in a linear algebraic way. Let A ∈ Rn×n be the adjacency matrix of G, with
Aij = Aji = wij and let D be a diagonal matrix with Dii = di . Let L = D –A be the graph Laplacian of G. Then we can see that
(1) is equivalent to
z(t) = (D + I )–1(Az(t–1) + s), (2)
where we denote z(t) = [z(t)1 , . . . , z
(t)
n ]. From this expression, it is not hard to check that
z∗ = (L + I )–1s. (3)
Alternative Models. The Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics model is a variation of DeGroot’s classical model for consen-
sus formation in social network [25]. The distinguishing characteristic of the FJ model is the addition of the innate opinions
encoded in s. Unlike the DeGroot model, which always converges in a consensus when G is connected (i.e., z∗i = z∗j for all
i, j) , innate opinions allow for a richer set of equilibrium opinions. In particular, z∗ will typically contain opinions ranging
continuously between –1 and 1.
Compared to DeGroot, the FJ dynamics more accurately model a world where an individual’s opinion (e.g. on a political
issue) is not shaped solely by social inuence, but also by an individual’s particular background, beliefs, or life circumstances.
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FJ dynamics are often studied in economics and game theory as an example of a game with price of anarchy greater than
one [11]. Other variations on the model include additional variables[38], for example, allowing the “stubbornness” of an
individual to vary [2, 19], or adding additional terms to Equation (1) that indicate when an individual cares about the average
network opinion as well as their neighbors’ opinions [28].
There also exist many models for opinion formation that fall outside of DeGroot’s original framework. Several models
involve discrete instead of continuously valued opinions. We refer to reader to the overview and discussion of dierent
proposals in [22]. In this paper, we focus on the original FJ dynamics, which are already rich enough to provide several
interesting insights on the dynamics of polarization, lter bubbles, and echo chambers.
2.2 Polarization, Disagreement, and Internal Conict
The fact that z∗ does not always contain a single consensus opinion makes the FJ model suited to understanding how
polarization arises on specic issues. Formally, we dene polarization as the variance of a given set of opinions.
Denition 2.1 (Polarization, Pz). For a vector of n opinions z ∈ [–1, 1]n, let mean(z) = 1n
∑n
j=1 zj be the mean opinion in z.
Pz def=
n∑
i=1
(zi – mean(z))2.
Pz ranges between 0 when all opinions are equal and n when half of the opinions in z equal 1 and half equal –1. Pz was
rst proposed as a measure of polarization in [49], and has since been used in other recent work studying polarization in
FJ dynamics [18, 52]. While we focus on Denition 2.1, we refer the interested reader to [33] for discussion of alternative
measures of polarization.
Under the FJ model, the polarization of the equilibrium set of opinions has a simple closed form. In particular, let
s = s – 1 · mean(s) be the mean centered set of innate opinions on a topic, and dene z similarly. Using that 1 is in the
null-space of any graph Laplacian L, it is easy to check (see [52] for details) that mean(z) = mean(s) and thus z∗ = (L + I )–1s.
It follows that:
Pz∗ = sT (L + I )–2s. (4)
In addition to polarization, we dene two other quantities of interest involving opinions in a social network. Both have
appeared repeatedly in studies involving the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics [2, 18, 52].
The rst quantity measures how much node i’s opinion diers from those of its neighbors.
Denition 2.2 (Local Disagreement,DG,z,i). For i ∈ 1, . . . , n, a vector of opinions z ∈ [–1, 1]n, and social network graph G,
DG,z,i def=
∑
j∈1,...n,j 6=i
wij(zi – zj)2.
We also dene an aggregate measure of disagreement.
Denition 2.3 (Global Disagreement, DG,z). For a vector of opinions z ∈ [–1, 1]n, and social network graph G,
DG,z def= 12 ·
n∑
i=1
DG,z,i .
The factor of 1/2 is included so that each edge (i, j) is only counted once. When G has graph Laplacian L, it can be checked
(see e.g. [52]) that DG,z = zTLz = zTLz.
Disagreement measures how misaligned each node’s opinion is with the opinions of its neighbors. We are also interested
in how misaligned a node’s expressed opinion is with its innate opinion.
Denition 2.4 (Local Internal Conict, Iz,s,i). For i ∈ 1, . . . , n, a vector of expressed opinions z ∈ [–1, 1]n, and a vector of
innate opinions s ∈ [–1, 1]n,
Iz,s,i
def= (zi – si)2.
We also dene an aggregate measure of internal conict.
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Denition 2.5 (Global Internal Conict, Iz,s). For a vector of expressed opinions z ∈ [–1, 1]n, and a vector of innate opinions
s ∈ [–1, 1]n,
Iz,s def=
n∑
i=1
Iz,s,i = ‖z – s‖22.
Since mean(z) = mean(s), we equivalently have Iz,s = ‖z – s‖22.
We can rewrite both the Friedkin-Johnsen update rule and equilibrium opinion vector as solutions to optimization prob-
lems involving minimizing disagreement and internal conict.
Claim 2.1. The Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics update rule (Equation 1) is equivalent to
z(t)i = arg min
z
DG,z,i + Iz,s,i . (5)
The equilibrium opinion vector z∗ (Equation 3) is equivalent to
z∗ = arg min
z
DG,z + Iz,s. (6)
It was also observed in [18] that polarization, disagreement, and internal conict obey a “conservation law” in the
Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics.
Claim 2.2 (Conservation law). For any network graph G with Laplacian L, innate opinions s ∈ [–1, 1]n, and equilibrium
opinions z∗ = (L + I )–1s,
Pz∗ + 2 · DG,z∗ + Iz∗,s = sT s. (7)
Now, combining Equations (6) and (7) tells us that z∗, the equilibrium solution of the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics, maxi-
mizes polarization plus disagreement.
z∗ = arg max
z
Pz +DG,z. (8)
Now suppose we add another actor, whose goal is to minimize disagreement, to the model. Informally, since the users
of the network are maximizing polarization + disagreement, and this other actor is minimizing disagreement, one would
expect polarization to increase. This intuitive observation motivates the network administrator dynamics, described below,
as a vehicle for the emergence of lter bubbles in a network.
3 The Emergence of Filter Bubbles
We introduce another actor to the Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics, the network administrator. The network adminis-
trator increases user engagement via personalized ltering, or showing users content that they are more likely to agree with.
In the Friedkin-Johnsen model, this corresponds to the network administrator reducing disagreement by making changes
to the edge weights of the graph (e.g. users see more content from users with similar opinions, and less content from users
with very dierent opinions).
3.1 Network Administrator Dynamics
Formally, our extension of the Friedkin-Johnsen dynamics has two actors: users, who change their expressed opinions z,
and a network administrator, who changes the graph G. The network administrator dynamics are as follows.
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Network Administrator Dynamics.
Given initial graph G(0) = G and initial opinions z(0) = s, in each round r = 1, 2, 3, . . .
• First, the users adopt new expressed opinions z(r). These opinions are the equilibrium opinions (Equation 3)
of the FJ dynamics model applied to G(r–1):
z(r) = (L(r–1) + I )–1s. (9)
Here L(r–1) is the Laplacian of G(r–1).
• Then, given user opinions z(r), the network administrator minimizes disagreement by modifying the graph,
subject to certain restrictions:
G(r) = arg min
G∈S
DG,z(r) . (10)
S is the constrained set of graphs the network administrator is allowed to change to.
3.1.1 Restricting changes to the graph
S, the set of all graphs the network admin can modify the graph to (Equation 20), should reect realistic changes that
a recommender system would make. For example, if the network admin is unconstrained, then the network admin will
simply set wij = 0 for all edges (i, j), as the empty graph minimizes disagreement. This is entirely unrealistic, however, as a
social network would never eliminate all connections between users. In our experiments, we dene S as follows:
Constraints on the network administrator.
Given  > 0 and initial graphG with adjacency matrixW , let S contain all graphs with adjacency matrixW satisfying:
1. ||W – W ||F <  · ||W ||F .
2.
∑
j Wij =
∑
j(W )ij for all i, i.e. the degree of each vertex should not change.
The rst constraint prevents the network administrator from making large changes to the initial graph W . Here, 
represents an L2 constraint parameter for how much the network administrator can change edge weight in the network.
The second constraint restricts the network administrator to only making changes that maintain the total level of interaction
for every user. Otherwise, the network administrator would reduce disagreement by decreasing the total amount of edge
weight in the graph—corresponding to having people spend less time on the network—which is not realistic.
Note that, since S gives a convex set over adjacency matrices and DG,z(r) is a convex function (as a function of the
adjacency matrix of G), the minimization problem in Equation (20) has a unique solution, eliminating any ambiguity for the
network administrator.
3.1.2 Convergence
Although it is not immediately obvious, the Network Administrator Dynamics do converge. In each round, the users are
minimizing disagreement + internal conict (Equation 6), while the network admin is minimizing disagreement (Equation
20). Thus, we can view the Network Administrator Dynamics as alternating minimization on disagreement + internal
conict:
arg min
z∈Rn,W∈S
DG,z + Iz,s . (11)
While DG,z + Iz,s is not convex in both z and W , it is convex in one variable when the other is xed. Because our con-
straints on W are also convex, alternating minimization will converge to a stationary point of DG,z + Iz,s [9, 10]. Moreover,
while the convergence point is not guaranteed to be the global minima of DG,z + Iz,s , we empirically nd that alternating
minimization converges to a better solution than well-known optimization methods such as sequential quadratic program-
ming [13] and DMCP [57].
3.2 Experiments
Using two real-world networks, we show that content ltering by the network administrator greatly increases polarization.
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Figure 2: Applying network administrator dynamics to real-world social networks. Details in Section 3.
Datasets. We use two real-world networks collected in [24], which were previously used to study polarization in [52].
We briey describe the datasets. More details can be found in [24, 52].
Twitter is a network with n = 548 nodes and m = 3638 edges. Edges correspond to user interactions. The network depicts
the debate over the Delhi legislative assembly elections of 2013.
Reddit is a network with n = 556 nodes and m = 8969 edges. Nodes are users who posted in the politics subreddit, and
there is an edge between two users if there exist two subreddits (other than politics) that both users posted in during the
given time period.
In both networks, each user has multiple opinions associated to them, obtained via sentiment analysis on multiple posts.
Similar to [52], we average each of these opinions to obtain an equilibrium expressed opinion z∗i for each user i. Inverting
Equation (3) yields innate opinions s = (L+I )z, which we clamp to [–1, 1]. This yields a rough estimate of the innate opinions
of each user, and provides a starting point for analyzing the dynamics of polarization.
Results. Figure 2 shows our results applying the network administrator dynamics to the Reddit and Twitter datasets.
For both networks, we calculate the increase in polarization after introducing the network administrator dynamics, relative
to the polarization of the equilibrium opinions without the network administrator. We plot this polarization increase versus
, the L2 parameter that species how much the network administrator can change the network. We also plot the increase
in disagreement versus .
Once  is large enough, polarization rises greatly in both networks. For example, when  = 0.5, polarization increases
by a factor of around 700× in the Reddit network, and a factor of around 60× in the Twitter network. While polarization
increases in both networks, it is interesting to observe that the Twitter network is more resilient than the Reddit network.
Surprisingly, for  < 0.7, disagreement also increases in the Reddit network—so the network administrator does not even
accomplish its goal of reducing disagreement.
Overall, our experiments illustrate how recommender systems can greatly increase opinion polarization in social net-
works, and give experimental credence to the theory of lter bubbles [54].
4 Fragile Consensus in Social Network Graphs
Our results in Section 3 establish that polarization in Friedkin-Johnsen opinion models can signicantly increase even when
the network administrator adjusts just a small amount of edge weight.
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To better understand this empirical nding, we present a theoretical analysis of the sensitivity of social networks to
outside inuence. In this work we are most interested in the eect of “ltering” by a network administrator, but our analysis
can also be applied to potential inuence from advertisers [35, 43] or propaganda [16]. We want to understand how easily
such outside inuence can aect the polarization of a network.
4.1 The Stochastic Block Model
We consider a common generative model for networks that can lead to polarization: the stochastic block model (SBM) [39].
Denition 4.1 (Stochastic Block Model (SBM)). The stochastic block model is a random graph model parametrized by n,
the size of the communities, and p, q, the edge probabilities. The model generates a graph G with 2n vertices, where the
vertex set of G, V = {v1, . . . , v2n}, is partitioned into two sets or “communities”, S = {v1, . . . , vn} and T = {vn+1, . . . , v2n}.
Edges are generated as follows. For all vi , vj ∈ V :
• If vi , vj ∈ S or vi , vj ∈ T , set wij = 1 with probability p, and wij = 0 otherwise.
• If vi ∈ S, vj ∈ T or vi ∈ T , vj ∈ S, set wij = 1 with probability q, and wij = 0 otherwise.
Also known as "planted partition model", the stochastic block model has as long history of study in statistics, machine
learning, theoretical computer science, statistical physics, and a number of other areas. It has been used to study social
dynamics, suggesting it as a natural choice for analyzing the dynamics of polarization [8, 48]. We refer the reader to the
survey in [1] for a complete discussion of applications and prior theoretical work on the model.
There are many possible variations on Denition 4.1. For example, S and T may dier in size or V may be partitioned
into more than two communities. Our specic setup is both simple and well-suited to studying the dynamics of opinions
with two poles, as in the Friedkin-Johnsen model.
4.2 Opinion Dynamics in the SBM
As in most work on the SBM, we consider the natural setting where q < p, i.e. the probability of two nodes being connected
is higher when the nodes are in the same community, and lower when they are in dierent communities. This setting results
in a graph G which is “partitioned”: G looks like two identically distributed Erdős-Rényi random graphs, connected by a
small number of random edges.
We assume the nodes in S have innate opinions clustered near –1 (one end of the opinion spectrum), and the nodes in T
have innate opinions clustered near 1, so that nodes with similar innate opinions are more likely to be connected by edges.
This property, known as "homophily", is commonly observed in real-world social networks [21]. Homophily arises because
innate opinions are often correlated with demographics like age, geographic location, and education level—demographics
that inuence the probability of two nodes being connected.
With the SBM chosen as a model for graphs which resemble real-world social networks, this section’s main question is:
How sensitive is the equilibrium polarization of a Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics to changes in the underlying
social network graph G, when G is generated from a SBM?
To answer this question, we analyze how the equilibrium polarization of SBM networks depends on parameters p and
q. We show that polarization of the equilibrium opinions decreases quadratically with q, which means that even networks
with very few edges between S and T have low polarization.
Formally, let A ∈ R2n×2n, D = diag(rowsum(A)), and L = D – A, be the adjacency matrix, diagonal degree matrix, and
Laplacian, respectively, of a graph G drawn from the stochastic block model. For simplicity, assume the FJ dynamics with
s set to completely polarized opinions, which perfectly correlate with a node vi’s membership in either S = {v1, . . . vn} or
T = {vn+1 . . . v2n}:
si =
{
1 for i ∈ 1, . . . , n
–1 for i ∈ n + 1, . . . , 2n (12)
Our main result is below.
Theorem 4.1 (Fragile consensus in SBM networks). Let G be a graph generated by the SBM with 1/n ≤ q ≤ p and p >
c log4 n/n for some universal constant c. Let s be the innate opinion vector dened in Equation (12), and let v∗ be the equilibrium
opinion vector according to the FJ dynamics. Then for suciently large n,
C
2n
(2nq + 1)2 ≤ Pv∗ ≤ C
′ 2n
(2nq + 1)2
with probability 97/100, for universal constants C,C′ .
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Note that our assumptions on q and p are mild – we simply need that, in expectation, each node has at least one
connection outside of its home community, and O(log4 n) connections within its home community. In real-world social
networks, the average number of connections typically exceeds these minimum requirements.
Figure 3: The equilibirum polarization of a SBM social network plotted as a function of nq, i.e. the average number of
“out-of-group” edges in the network per node. Polarization falls rapidly with nq, leading to a state of potentially fragile
consensus, where removing a small number of edges from a network can vastly increase polarization.
Remarks. Theorem 4.1 leads to two important observations. First, with high probability, the equilibrium polarization of
a SBM network is independent of p, the probability of generating an “in-group" edge. This is highly counterintuitive: one
would expect that increasing p would decrease polarization, as each node would be surrounded by a larger proportion of
like-minded nodes.
Second, when nq is suciently large, polarization scales as ∼ 2n(2nq)2 . Since the maximum polarization in a network
with 2n nodes is 2n, this says that the polarization of an SBM graph drops quadratically with nq, the expected number of
“out-of-group” edges per node. This behavior is visualized in Figure 3.
The second observation suggests an interesting view about social networks that are relatively un-polarized (i.e., are near
consensus). In particular, it is possible for such networks to be in a state of fragile consensus, meaning that if small number
of edges are removed between S and T — for example by a network administrator — then polarization will rapidly increase.
This is the case even when edges between S and T are eliminated randomly, as eliminating edges randomly produces a new
G′ also drawn from an SBM, but with parameter q′ < q. Referring to Figure 3 and Theorem 4.1, G′ can have signicantly
higher polarization than G, even when q′ is close to q.
4.3 Expectation Analysis
To prove Theorem 4.1, we apply McSherry’s “perturbation” approach for analyzing the stochastic block model [51, 60]. We
rst bound the polarization of an SBM graph in expectation, and then show that the bound carries over to random SBM
graphs.
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Lemma 4.2. Let G be a graph with 2n vertices and adjacency matrix
A =
0 p . . . p q q . . . q
p 0
. . .
... q q
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . p
...
. . . . . . q
p . . . p 0 q . . . q q
q q . . . q 0 p . . . p
q q
. . .
... p 0
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . q
...
. . . . . . p
q . . . q q p . . . p 0


Let s, as dened in Equation (12), be the innate opinion vector for the network, and let w∗ be the resulting equilibrium opinion
vector according to the FJ dynamics. Then,
Pw∗ = 2n(2nq + 1)2 . (13)
Proof. Let D and L be the diagonal degree matrix and Laplacian of G, respectively. Since s is mean centered, we have that
Pw∗ = sT (L + I )–2s. To analyze Pw∗ , we need to obtain an explicit representation for the eigendecomposition of (L + I )–2.
Let U = [u(1),u(2)] where u(1) = 1√2n12n and u
(2) = 1√2ns. We can check that A + pI = UΛU
T where Λ = diag(n(p +
q), n(p – q)). Now, let U = [u(1),u(2),Z] ∈ R2n×2n where Z ∈ R2n×(2n–2) is a matrix with orthonormal columns satisfying
ZTu(1) = 0 and ZTu(2) = 0. Such a Z can be obtained by extending u(1),u(2) to an orthonormal basis. Note that U is
orthogonal, i.e. UUT = UTU = I . Since L + I = (1 + n(p + q))I – (A + pI ), we see that
L + I = USUT . (14)
where S = diag([1, 2nq + 1, n(p + q) + 1, . . . , n(p + q) + 1]).
Since U is orthonormal, it follows that (L + I )–2 has eigendecomposition (L + I )–2 = U˜ S–2U˜T is . Moreover, since
s =
√
2n · u(2), we have that s is orthogonal to u(1) and the columns of Z . Thus,
Pw∗ = sT (L + I )–2s = 2n(2nq + 1)2 .
4.4 Perturbation Analysis
With the proof of Lemma 4.2 in place, we prove Theorem 4.1 by appealing to the following standard result on matrix
concentration.
Lemma 4.3 (Corollary of Theorem 1.4 in [62]). Let A be the adjacencymatrix of a graph drawn from the SBM, and let A = E[A]
as in Lemma 4.2. There exists a universal constant c such that if p ≥ c log4 n/n, then with probability 99/100,
‖A – A‖2 ≤ 3√pn.
We also require a standard Bernstein inequality (see e.g. [63]):
Lemma 4.4 (Bernstein Inequality). Let Xi , . . . ,Xm be independent random variables with variances σ21 , . . . ,σ2m and |Xi | ≤ 1
almost surely for all i. Let X =
∑m
i=1 Xi , µ = E[X], and σ2 =
∑m
i=1 σ
2
i . Then, we have the following inequality:
Pr[|X – µ| > ] ≤ e 
2
2σ2+2/3 .
Using these two bounds, we rst prove the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5. Let L be the Laplacian of a graph G drawn from the SBM and let L = E[L]. For xed constant c0, with probability
98/100,
‖L – L‖2 ≤ c0
√
pn log n.
Note that when p ≥ c log4 n, c0
√
pn log n ≤ c0√
c log1.5 n
· pn, so for suciently large n, this lemma implies that ‖L – L‖2 ≤ 12pn.
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Proof. Let D be the degree matrix of G and recall that E[D] = D. By triangle inequality, ‖L – L‖2 ≤ ‖D – D‖2 + ‖A – A‖2.
By Lemma 4.3, ‖A – A‖2 < 3√pn. Additionally, ‖D – D‖2 is bounded by maxi |Dii – Dii |. Dii is a sum of Bernoulli random
variables with total variance σ2 upper bounded by 2np. It follows from Lemma 4.4 and our assumption that p = Ω(1/n) that
for any i, |Dii –Dii | ≤ c1
√
pn log n with probability 1– 1200n for a xed universal constant c1. By a union bound, we have that
maxi |Dii – Dii | ≤
√
pn log n with probability 99/100 for all i. A second union bound with the event that ‖A – A‖2 < 3√pn
gives the lemma with c0 = 3 + c1.
With Lemma 4.5 in place, we are ready to prove Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We separately consider two cases.
Case 1, q ≥ p/2. In this setting, all eigenvalues of L+ I lie between pn+ 1 and 1.5pn+ 1, except for the smallest eigenvalue of
1, which has corresponding eigenvector u(1) = 1/
√
2n. Since Lu(1) = 0, u(1) is also an eigenvector of L + I . Let P = u(1)u(1)T
be a projection onto this eigenvector. Using that u(1) is an eigenvalue of both L and L and applying Lemma 4.5, we have:
(0.5pn + 1) (I – P)  (I – P)(L + I )(I – P)  (2pn + 1)(I – P).
Since (I – P)(L + I )(I – P) and (I – P) commute, it follows that (0.5pn + 1)2(I – P)  (I – P)(L + I )2(I – P)  (2pn + 1)2(I – P).
Finally, noting that (I – P)s = s, sT s = 2n, and M  N ⇒ N–1  M–1 gives the Theorem for q ≥ p/2.
Case 2, q < p/2. The small q case is more challenging, requiring a strengthening of Lemma 4.5. Lemma 4.5 asserts that
every eigenvalue of L is within additive error c0
√
pn log n from the corresponding eigenvalue in L. While strong for L’s
largest eigenvalues of (p + q)n, the statement can be weak for L’s smallest non-zero eigenvalue of 2nq. We require a tighter
relative error bound, which we show in the lemma below.
Lemma 4.6. Assume 1/n ≤ q < p/2. Let λ2(L) be L’s smallest non-zero eigenvalue. With probability 99/100, for suciently
large n,
1
2nq ≤ λ2(L) ≤ 4nq.
Before proving Lemma 4.6, we use it to complete the proof of Theorem 4.1. To do so, we require the following well-known
bound.
Lemma 4.7 (Davis-Kahan Theorem [23]). Let M and H be m × m symmetric matrices with eigenvectors v1, . . . , vm and
~v1, . . . , ~vm, respectively, and eigenvalues λ1, . . . ,λm and λ˜1, . . . , λ˜m. If ‖M – H‖2 ≤ , then for all i,
(vTi ~vi)2 ≥ 1 –
2
minj 6=i |λi – λj |2
.
Continuing the proof of Theorem 4.1, let P = u(1)u(1)T . Let U˜ ∈ R2n×(2n–1) be an orthonormal basis for the span of I – P .
We will apply Lemma 4.7 to the matrices U˜TLU˜ and U˜TLU˜ . Since u(1) is an eigenvector of both L and L, the eigenvectors of
U˜TLU˜ and U˜TLU˜ are equal to the remaining 2n– 1 eigenvectors of L and L left multiplied by U˜T . The eigenvalues of U˜TLU˜
and U˜TLU˜ are simply the non-zero eigenvalues of L and L.
Let y be the eigenvector of L associated with λ2(L). Theorem 4.5 implies that ‖U˜TLU˜ – U˜TLU˜‖ ≤ c0
√
pn log n and so
by Lemma 4.7, we have:
(u(2)T U˜T U˜y)2 ≥ 1 – c
2
0pn log n
((p – q)n)2 .
Since p–q ≥ p/2, our assumption that p = Ω(log4 n/n) implies that (u(2)T U˜T U˜y)2 ≥ 1–O(1/ log3 n)), which is≥ 1/2 for large
enough n. Since y and u(2) are eigenvalues of L and L respectively, both are orthogonal to u(1). So (u(2)T U˜T U˜y)2 = (u(2)Ty)2.
We conclude:
1/2 ≤ (yTu(2))2 ≤ 1. (15)
In other words, L’s second eigenvector y has a large inner product with L’s second eigenvector u(2).
Since L and (L + I )–2 have the same eigenvectors, we can bound Pz∗ = sT (L + I )–2s = 2n · u(2)T (L + I )–2u(2) as follows:
(yTu(2))2(λ2(L) + 1)–2 ≤ 12nPz∗
≤ (yTu(2))2(λ2(L) + 1)–2 + (1 – (yTu(2))2)‖(L + I )–2R‖2
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where R = I – yyT – u(1)u(1)T is a projection matrix onto (L + I )’s largest n – 2 eigenvectors. From the same argument used
for Case 1, all of these eigenvectors have corresponding eigenvalues≥ 12pn + 1, and thus ‖(L + I )–2R‖2 ≤ 1( 12 pn+1)2 ≤
1
(qn+1)2 .
Applying (15) and Lemma 4.6, we have:
1
2
2n
(4nq + 1)2 ≤ Pz∗ ≤
3n
( 12nq + 1)2
,
which establishes the theorem.
All we have left is to prove Lemma 4.6.
Proof of Lemma 4.6. We will rst prove that
λ2(L) ≤ 4nq. (16)
To do so, we apply the Courant-Fischer minmax theorem, from which is suces to exhibit two orthogonal unit vectors with
Rayleigh quotient ≤ 4nq. The rst will be u(1) = 1/√2n, which has Rayleigh quotient u(1)TLu(1) = 0. The second will be
u(2) = s/
√
2n, which is orthogonal to u(1).
Let γ = u(2)TLu(2). We can check that 2nγ is exactly equal to the number of entries in the o diagonal n × n blocks
of A – i.e. it is twice the number of edges in G between dierent communities. Appealing to Lemma 4.4, we have that
|2n2q – 2nγ| ≤ 11n√q with probability 99/100 as long as q > 1/n. So for large enough n,
1
2nq ≤ γ ≤ 4nq, (17)
which proves (16). Next we establish that
λ2(L) ≥ 12nq. (18)
Again we apply the minmax principle, this time exhibiting 2n–1 vectors with Rayleigh quotient≥ 12nq. The rst vector will
be u(2), which we know has suciently large Rayleigh quotient by (17). For the remaining vectors, let z1, . . . , z2n–2 ∈ R2n
be a set of 2n – 2 orthonormal vectors which are orthogonal to both u(1) and u(2).
From (15), we can derive that for any i, (zTi y)2 ≤ 1/2, where y is the eigenvector corresponding to L’s second smallest
eigenvalue. Since all other eigenvalues of L are ≥ 12pn, we thus have, for all i,
zTi Lzi ≥
1
2 ·
1
2pn ≥
1
2qn.
This proves (18), which along with (16) gives the Lemma.
5 A Simple Remedy
Throughout this paper, our results have largely been pessimistic. When we introduce the network administrator, an external
actor who lters content for users, we see that polarization rises and echo chambers form, along the lines of Pariser’s lter
bubble theory [54]. Our analysis in the SBM further evidences that social networks can easily be in a state of “fragile
consensus", which leaves them vulnerable to become extremely polarized even when only a small number of edges are
modied.
In this section, however, we conclude with a positive result. We nd that, with a slight modication to the network ad-
ministrator dynamics, the lter bubble eect is vastly mitigated. Even more surprisingly, disagreement also barely increases,
showing that it is possible for the network administrator to reduce polarization in the network while not hurting its own
objective.
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(d) Change in disagreement vs  for Twitter network.
Figure 4: Applying regularized network administrator dynamics to real-world social networks, γ = 0.2. Details in Section 5.
5.1 Regularized Dynamics
We modify the role of the network administrator by adding an L2 regularization term to its objective function.
Regularized Network Administrator Dynamics.
Given initial graph G(0) = G and initial opinions z(0) = s, in each round r = 1, 2, 3, . . .
• First, the users adopt new expressed opinions z(r). These opinions are the equilibrium opinions (Equation 3)
of the FJ dynamics model applied to G(r–1):
z(r) = (L(r–1) + I )–1s. (19)
Here L(r–1) is the Laplacian of G(r–1).
• Then, given user opinions z(r), the network administrator minimizes disagreement by modifying the graph,
subject to certain restrictions:
G(r) = arg min
G∈S
DG,z(r) + +γ‖W‖2F (20)
S is the constrained set of graphs the network administrator is allowed to change to, W is the adjacency matrix
of G, and γ > 0 is a xed constant.
γ > 0 is a xed constant that controls the strength of regularization. We use L2 regularization because
∣∣∣∣∣arg minx:‖x‖1=1 ‖x‖2
∣∣∣∣∣ =
1n/n for x ∈ Rn. So intuitively, since the network administrator must keep the total edge weight of the graph constant,
the addition of the regularization term encourages the network administrator to make modications to many edges in the
graph, instead of making large, concentrated changes to a small number of edges.
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5.2 Results
Figure 4 shows the results of the regularized network administrator dynamics on the Reddit and Twitter networks, with
γ = 0.2. Polarization increases by at most 4%, no matter the value of . This is a drastic dierence from the non-regularized
network administrator dynamics, where polarization increased by over 4000%. Disagreement, which the network adminis-
trator is incentivized to decrease, increases by at most 5%.
6 Conclusion and Future Directions
Social media has become an integral part of our lives, with a majority of people using at least one social media app daily
[58]. Despite enabling users access to a diversity of information, social media usage has been linked to increased societal po-
larization [30]. One popular theory to explain this phenomenon is the idea of lter bubbles: by automatically recommending
content that a user is likely to agree with (i.e. content ltering), social network algorithms create polarized “echo chambers"
of users [54]. While intellectually satisfying, evidence for the lter bubble theory is mainly post-hoc, and the theory has
been met with skepticism [7, 14, 41, 53, 61, 64].
In this work, we propose an extension to the Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics model that explicitly models rec-
ommendation systems in social networks. Using this model, we experimentally show the emergence of lter bubbles in
real-world networks. We also provide theoretical justication for why social networks are so vulnerable to outside actors.
Our work poses many follow-up questions. For example, as discussed earlier, variants of the Bounded Condence Model
(BCM) have previously been used to argue that polarization is caused by “biased assimilation" of content by users [21,
26, 34]. In this work, we use the Friedkin-Johnsen opinion dynamics model because of its linear algebraic interpretation,
which allows us to establish concrete theoretical results. An interesting follow-up would be to incorporate our network
administrator dynamics into the more complex BCM variants used by [34] and [26].
Another interesting direction is modeling the interference of other outside actors, as our theoretical analysis is not
limited to recommendation systems. Can we develop a similar framework for modeling the eects of cyber warfare (see e.g.
[55]) on societal polarization? And perhaps more importantly, can we also develop methods to mitigate the eects of cyber
warfare on polarization?
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